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Abstract
In the direct parameter speciﬁcation (DPS) mode of sensorimotor control, response parameters can be speciﬁed by stimuli that
are not consciously perceived [Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung 52 (1990) 207]. DPS is contingent on the current
intentions. The invisible stimuli can be processed for the purposes of sensorimotor control only if they match the actual intentions,
for example, share task-relevant features. The present experiments explore whether attentional capture by masked abrupt-onset
stimuli is mediated via DPS. Participants judged which of two visual targets appeared ﬁrst. Masked primes preceded one of the
targets. The primes were either similar to the targets or not, in shape, or in color. Target-like (task-relevant), but not distractor-like
(task-irrelevant), primes facilitated perceptual latencies of targets trailing at their positions. Thus, the latency eﬀects resulted from
DPS of an attention shift, rather than from bottom-up capture or from top-down search for dynamic features.
 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
For several decades, visual stimuli masked by meta-
contrast have been used as a methodological tool for
investigating human cognition (Breitmeyer, 1984; Exner,
1868; Werner, 1935; for reviews see Breitmeyer & Og-
men, 2000; Enns & Di Lollo, 2000; see also Marcel,
1983). Metacontrast masking is an eﬃcient means for
excluding a stimulus from conscious perception without
obliterating other of its eﬀects, especially inﬂuences that
do not depend on awareness of the stimulus. In one
of the ﬁrst experimental studies of such dissociations,
Fehrer and Raab (1962) demonstrated that simple re-
sponses towards a visual target were unimpaired by
masking this target. Detection latencies were equally fast
if the target was clearly visible and if it was masked by a
temporally trailing visual stimulus. The dissociation
between a lack of awareness on the one hand, and non-
consciously mediated eﬀects of the masked stimulus on
the other hand has been termed the metacontrast disso-
ciation (e.g., Klotz & Neumann, 1999).
Masked visual primes presented prior to targets can
inﬂuence target processing in a variety of ways. They
can, for example, reduce spatial uncertainty or draw
attention towards the target location. Evidence for such
an attention-based eﬀect of invisible primes has been
found in cueing research (e.g., Jaskowski, van der
Lubbe, Schlotterbeck, & Verleger, 2002; Lambert, Nai-
kar, McLachlan, & Aitken, 1999; McCormick, 1997;
Steglich & Neumann, 2000). Among other eﬀects,
priming a location and thus summoning attention fa-
cilitates the perceived onset of stimuli trailing at this
location (perceptual latency priming). 1 Compared with a
stimulus that is not led by a prime, the perceived onset
of a primed stimulus is predated. This phenomenon was
demonstrated in several studies using a temporal order
judgment paradigm (e.g., Scharlau, 2002; Scharlau &
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1 The term perceptual latency priming refers to the perception that in
a pair of two simultaneously presented stimuli, the primed one appears
as the ﬁrst one, rather than to a possible explanation of this
phenomenon. Whether this phenomenon is due to a speeded process-
ing of the target resulting in decreased latency or, alternatively,
ﬁltering costs (Kahneman, Treisman, & Burkell, 1983) or additional
noise (e.g., Pashler, 1998) induced by the target at an unprimed
location, is a topic not covered by the present experiments.
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Neumann, in press; Shore, Spence, & Klein, 2001;
Steglich & Neumann, 2000).
These studies supported an attentional explanation of
perceptual latency priming by excluding several alter-
native explanations. (1) Perceptual latency priming does
not vary with within-trial prime-target similarity. Thus,
it is not due to perceptual or sensory priming of the
target features (Scharlau & Neumann, in press). (2)
Perceptual latency priming is elicited by masked primes
that precede the target, but not by primes that follow the
target. Thus, perceptual latency priming is not due to
amalgamating prime and target into a compound event
and judging an inferred perceptual center. Further, it is
known that well-visible primes elicit the same amount of
perceptual latency priming as masked primes (Scharlau
& Neumann, in press), and that a visible primes onset is
perceived correctly (Scharlau, 2002). From this ﬁnding
follows that a misperception of the primes onset or a
temporal integration of prime and target is no precon-
dition for perceptual latency priming. (3) Under ap-
propriate conditions, such as an independent variation
of attentional allocation and judgment criteria, percep-
tual latency priming by peripheral cues is largely inde-
pendent of response bias (Shore et al., 2001).
In sum, in accordance with recent studies on atten-
tion and temporal order judgment (Gibson & Egeth,
1994; Hikosaka, Miyauchi, & Shimojo, 1993; Maylor,
1985; Scharlau, 2002; Scharlau & Neumann, in press;
Shore et al., 2001; Spence, Shore, & Klein, 2001; Stel-
mach & Herdman, 1991; Zackon, Casson, Zafar, Stel-
mach, & Racette, 1999), perceptual latency priming may
be interpreted as an attention-mediated eﬀect of a pe-
ripheral, masked or unmasked prime. Given that per-
ceptual latency priming is indeed attentional in origin, it
could be mediated by at least three diﬀerent attentional
control mechanisms.
(1) Visuo-spatial attention might be captured in a bot-
tom-up fashion by abrupt onsets (attentional or ex-
ogenous capture; Jonides, 1981; Yantis & Jonides,
1984). The rapid capture of attention by abrupt on-
sets has been attributed to bottom-up processes,
since shifts elicited by abrupt visual onsets neither
depend on cue validity (Jonides, 1981; Posner & Co-
hen, 1984; Remington, Johnston, & Yantis, 1992),
nor on processing load (Jonides, 1981), and the
eﬀects cannot easily be suppressed (Remington
et al., 1992). Perceptual latency priming by invisible
information might reﬂect such bottom-up capture
by abrupt onset stimuli (McCormick, 1997).
(2) However, Folk, Remington, and Johnston (1992) re-
ported that abrupt onset cues entailed capture only if
participants searched for abrupt onset targets (or
other dynamic features, e.g., motion, Folk, Reming-
ton, & Wright, 1994), but that capture was absent if
this was not the case (see also Atchley, Kramer, &
Hillstrom, 2000; Folk & Remington, 1998; Reming-
ton, Folk, &McLean, 2001). According to the contin-
gent-capture hypothesis, top-down control settings
mediate attention shifts. These settings can be directed
to either dynamic features, such as abrupt onset and
motion, or static features such as speciﬁc colors. Per-
ceptual latency priming might be a case of top-down
contingent capture. Once targets have abrupt onsets,
abrupt-onset cues might capture attention.
(3) Finally, perceptual latency priming could be due to
direct parameter speciﬁcation (DPS) of an attention
shift. According to the contingent-capture account,
presenting abrupt-onset cues among abrupt-onset
targets is a necessary precondition for attentional
capture by the cues. Yet, whether presenting
abruptly onsetting cues in the context of abrupt-on-
set targets is also a suﬃcient precondition for atten-
tional capture by the cues is not so clear. If DPS
accounts for the attentional eﬀect, suﬃcient precon-
ditions for attentional capture by cues or primes,
and hence, for perceptual latency priming, only
would be met if cues match the features which dis-
criminate targets from irrelevant elements (the inten-
tionally searched-for, matching or discriminative
features). This holds irrespective of whether these
features are dynamic or static. Therefore, even if
cues and targets have abrupt onsets, eﬀects should
be contingent on the cues match to the control set-
tings directed to the static features of the targets
(e.g., its color or shape). Originally, the DPS model
was developed to account for sensorimotor eﬀects of
invisible stimulus features such as visual shape (Neu-
mann, 1990; see also Klotz & Neumann, 1999).
However, it may also be used to explain shifts of
visuo-spatial attention. 2 In the following, the
notion of DPS will be explained in some detail.
DPS is a mode of action control. Provided that an
action plan has been completed, sensory information can
be used to specify free parameters of the responses di-
rectly, that is, without a mediating conscious perception
of the very same information. The term direct thus de-
notes a processing route from early stimulus encoding to
action control that shortcuts perceptual awareness. 3
2 In accordance with other concepts, such as the premotor theory of
attention (Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umilta, 1987), the applica-
tion of the DPS concept to attention shifts results in modelling visuo-
spatial attention in a way highly similar to an overt action. However,
we do not want to exclude other possibilities of attentional control,
such as attending to objects or features (e.g., Baylis & Driver, 1993). In
the present study, we thus test the possibility that attention may be
under DPS control.
3 The concept is not related to Gibsons theory of direct perception
(1979). According to Gibson, direct pick-up of information from the
environment means that perception needs not be mediated by much
processing of the very same information at all.
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The term parameter should not be understood too nar-
rowly. It applies to any of a variety of continuously given
response features, such as for instance grip force (Fel-
lows et al., 2002) or pointing direction (Schmidt, 2002),
as well as to discretely given response features, such as
the side of the responding hand (Klotz & Neumann,
1999). The DPS model claims that action control is
possible without conscious recognition of the relevant
stimuli, and that this type of control depends critically on
what the organism intends at a certain moment.
Early research on DPS has focused mainly on dem-
onstrating action control by stimuli totally absent from
conscious perception. To give an example, in the meta-
contrast paradigm, conscious perception of a primes
shape is prevented by metacontrast masking. Yet, the
prime reliably reduces response time and error rate if its
shape signals the same response as the target (congruent
condition), and increases response time and error rate if
its shape signiﬁes the opposite response (incongruent
condition) (e.g., Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Klotz & Wolﬀ,
1995; Neumann & Klotz, 1994). Further, the speciﬁca-
tion of response parameters by masked, invisible primes
is evident in the lateralised readiness potential of the
EEG (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Leuthold & Kopp,
1998). Numerous other experimental studies have dem-
onstrated aspects of visually guided action control either
in the absence of conscious perception or dissociated
from conscious perception. For example, manual ac-
tions such as grasping or pointing may not be subject to
visual illusions (Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995;
Bridgeman, Kirch, & Sperling, 1981; Haﬀenden &
Goodale, 1998; though see Franz, 2001; Franz, Gegen-
furtner, B€ulthoﬀ, & Fahle, 2000).
The DPS concept also holds that visual action con-
trol is top-down and ﬂexible rather than bottom-up and
hard-wired. It depends on current behavioural inten-
tions or action plans (Neumann, 1990). The notion of
intention-dependence only recently has come into re-
search focus. For example, Ansorge, Heumann, and
Scharlau (2002) found that invisible primes which did
not match to the response-relevant, static target fea-
tures did not inﬂuence response times. Processing of
the primes thus was selectively entailed by their match
to the decisive, in this case static, features. Conver-
gent evidence comes from a priming study by Damian
(2001). Masked number primes facilitated or inhibited
responses to visible number targets. Yet, the inﬂuence
was restricted to prime numbers that were part of the
target set. Evidently, intentions to respond to, to search
for, or to otherwise process the decisive features of the
targets are necessary preconditions for responses to be
speciﬁed by non-consciously registered analogues of the
targets.
Sensorimotor DPS eﬀects thus depend on having the
features of a masked prime match a corresponding top-
down control setting directed to visible targets (the ac-
tion plan). This holds even if both primes and targets are
deﬁned by dynamic features, that is, if both have abrupt
onsets. Perceptual latency priming might be a case of
DPS, with the parameters directly speciﬁed being the
direction or the amplitude of an attention shift. In the
current investigation, this hypothesis will be tested.
The hypothesis derived from the DPS account is that
attention shifts can only be elicited by primes that match
the current intentions, and that primes that do not
match the current intentions will not attract attention,
even if they have an abrupt onset. By contrast, based
on the bottom-up attentional-capture account or on
the assumption that search for abrupt-onset targets is a
suﬃcient precondition for the priming eﬀect, no such
diﬀerential eﬀects are expected. Perceptual latency
priming will exclusively depend on the primes abrupt
onset. From the contingent-capture hypothesis, no clear
predictions can be drawn. First, contingent capture has
so far been reported only for visible cues (e.g., Folk et al.,
1992; Folk et al., 1994). Second, in terms of contingent
capture it is unclear for which features observers search
in a temporal-order-judgment experiment. Since the task
requires the observer to report the shape of the ﬁrst or
the second stimulus, they may search for onset, or for
speciﬁc shapes or colors (e.g., Scharlau & Neumann, in
press; Shore et al., 2001). If onset is a suﬃcient pre-
condition for contingent capture when searching for
abrupt onset, no diﬀerential eﬀects of primes diﬀering in
shape or color should be expected.
2. Overview
In the present experiments, perceptual latency prim-
ing was assessed by temporal order judgments of a
primed and an unprimed target. These targets were ac-
companied by task-irrelevant distractor stimuli. In Ex-
periment 1, in addition to the targets that were to be
judged, abrupt-onset distractors and abrupt-onset tar-
get-like primes were presented with variable onset in-
tervals. All primes were masked. They were similar in
shape to the targets, whereas the distractors had a dif-
ferent shape. If DPS accounts for perceptual latency
priming, an eﬀect of the masked target-like primes
should be observed, but no inﬂuence of the distractors.
However, if abrupt-onset stimuli capture attention ir-
respective of their other, static features, abrupt-onset
distractors should compromise perceptual latency
priming. In Experiment 2, priming by masked distrac-
tor-like and masked target-like primes was compared
directly. According to the DPS account, perceptual la-
tency priming was expected for target-like but not for
distractor-like primes. Experiment 3a sought to replicate
and extend the ﬁndings by using the feature of color. In
Experiment 3b, we tested to which amount the color
primes of Experiment 3a were masked.
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3. Experiment 1
Experiment 1 assessed perceptual latency priming by
masked abrupt-onset primes that are similar in shape to
the targets, that is, contain the searched-for feature. It
further tested whether these eﬀects can be compromised
by the presence of abrupt-onset distractors. A distractor
was presented either leading the prime, between prime
and target, or trailing the target. In the leading condi-
tions, it preceded the critical prime-target sequence. If
the distractors onset automatically captured attention,
perceptual latency priming should be compromised
under these circumstances. In the intermediate condi-
tion, the distractor disrupted the critical sequence of
prime and primed target, and might equally interfere. If
trailing the target, the distractor should never interfere.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Thirteen voluntary participants took part in the ex-
periment (8 female; mean age 26.2 years). Informed
consent was obtained. Participants received € 14 or
course credits. There was an additional reward of € 5 for
the best participant. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Two participants had
to be excluded because they showed no discrimination
of order (for reasons unknown).
3.1.2. General design
The experiment consisted of three task sessions. The
sessions were devoted to speeded responses, temporal
order judgments (TOJ), and signal discrimination. As
the speeded-response task is not related to the question
examined here, its results will not be reported. A session
lasted about 45 min.
3.1.3. Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure in the TOJ task
Dark grey stimuli (14 cd/m2) were presented on a
light grey (103 cd/m2) background on a 17 in. color
monitor with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Participants sat in
a dimly lit room. Their head rested on a chin rest, their
line of gaze was straight ahead, and viewing distance
was ﬁxed at 60 cm. They responded by pressing either
the left or the right key of a mouse.
In each trial, a sequence of three or four visible
stimuli was presented, a distractor and a target pair,
sometimes accompanied by a prime. The targets (rele-
vant stimuli) were a square and a diamond with
star-shaped inner contours which allow for good meta-
contrast masking (Klotz & Neumann, 1999). Edge
length of the targets was 2.3. The distractor was a circle
of the same intensity as the targets. It was task-irrele-
vant, and participants were instructed to ignore the
distractor. Each of the stimuli appeared in one of the
four quarters of the screen with a diagonal distance of
8.5 from ﬁxation. In two thirds of the trials, an addi-
tional stimulus, the prime, preceded one of the targets. It
was a small replica of one of the targets ﬁtting into the
inner contours of the target that appeared later at the
primes location and masked the prime by metacontrast.
The prime had an edge length of 1.7. Its shape was
either congruent to the target (identical shape, e.g., a
square prime preceding a square target) or incongruent
(alternative shape; e.g., a diamond prime preceding a
square target; for a sample trial, see Fig. 1). Prime-target
congruency or incongruency thus was deﬁned by shape
similarity and not by location. (Location was always the
same for the pair of prime and primed target because
perceptual latency priming depends on that the prime
draws visuo-spatial attention towards a location. The
processing of further stimuli at this location is facilitated
by attention.) Both congruent and incongruent primes
tim
e
primed
stimulus
unprimed
stimulus
prime
distractor
fixation
target
SOA
primed
stimulus
unprimed
stimulus
prime
distractor
fixation
target
SOA
priming
SOA
priming
SOA
correct judgment:
“diamond first”
correct judgment:
“square first”
Fig. 1. Succession of events in two sample trials of Experiment 1. The prime precedes the primed target at its location. On the left, prime shape is
congruent and the distractor timing intermediate, on the right, prime shape is incongruent and the distractor trails the sequence. Target, prime, and
distractor shapes are not drawn to scale. Temporal order, but not durations, of the stimuli are given accurately. Primes were shown for one video
cycle, the other stimuli for 10 cycles. The longer duration is indicated in that these other stimuli are depicted on two successive frames in the ﬁgure.
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matched the set of intentionally searched-for features
because shape was the task-relevant feature in Experi-
ment 1. In a further third of the trials, no prime was
shown (unprimed condition). A ﬁxation spot consisting
of a small black rectangle was visible on the screen
throughout the experiment.
Target SOAs (stimulus onset asynchronies between
the two targets) ranged between )96 and +96 ms in steps
of 48 ms. Negative numbers indicate that the primed
target was presented ﬁrst, and positive that the unpri-
med target appeared ﬁrst. The prime led the primed
target by 64 ms. The distractor led either the prime or
the primed target by 48 ms, or it followed the primed
target by 48 ms. These three distractor conditions will be
referred to as leading, intermediate, and trailing. Targets
and distractor were presented for 160 ms, and the prime
for 16 ms. All spatial sequences of distractors and tar-
gets were equally likely. There were 36 conditions (4
target SOAs 3 distractor conditions 3 priming con-
ditions). Each condition was presented 24 times in a
random order resulting in a total of 864 trials.
The participants were instructed to ﬁxate a central
ﬁxation square throughout each trial. 4 They judged the
temporal order of the targets. Half of the participants
indicated with the left mouse button that they had seen
the square ﬁrst, and with the right button that the dia-
mond was perceived ﬁrst; for the other half the assign-
ment was reversed. There might be two modes of
following the instruction: either to attend to both targets
and to report the shape of the ﬁrst one, or else to attend
to the ﬁrst target and to report its shape. Most partici-
pants ﬁnd it easier to use the ﬁrst strategy. According to
their reports they observe the pair of targets and deter-
mine the shape of the ﬁrst of them. The instruction
emphasised accuracy. Every 100 trials, a break was in-
serted automatically.
3.1.4. Stimuli and procedure in the signal discrimination
task
Stimuli in the signal discrimination session were
identical with the TOJ task with only one exception.
Since participants had to discriminate the primes
shape, no unprimed trials were presented. Thus, there
were 24 conditions (4 target SOAs 3 distractor con-
ditions 2 priming conditions). Each condition was
presented 24 times in a random order resulting in a
total of 576 trials. Throughout each trial, the partici-
pants ﬁxated a central ﬁxation square. After the trial,
they had to indicate whether the primes shape was a
square or a diamond. Half of the participants indicated
a square prime with the left, and a diamond prime with
the right mouse button; for the other half, this assign-
ment was reversed.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. TOJ task
From the judgment data, psychometric functions
were constructed. The frequency of the judgment ‘‘un-
primed target ﬁrst’’ was determined for each experi-
mental condition (priming distractor condition) and
target SOA. The individual psychometric functions
could best be approximated by logistic functions. Logit
analysis (Finney, 1971) was used to estimate the point of
subjective simultaneity (PSS) and the Diﬀerence Limen
(DL) for each participant. PSS is the point on the ﬁtted
logistic function at which the two judgments are equally
likely, that is, the observer cannot discriminate the
temporal order (subjective simultaneity). PSS should be
zero in unprimed trials. A positive shift of PSS in primed
trials indicates perceptual latency priming: Simultaneity
is perceived when the unprimed stimulus leads the
primed one the latency of which is facilitated by the
prime. DL indicates the slope of the psychometric
function (interquartile range) and thus measures dis-
crimination accuracy. The smaller DL, the better tem-
poral perception. If necessary, degrees of freedom were
corrected by the Greenhouse-Geisser-coeﬃcient e, and a
was adjusted accordingly (Hays, 1988).
Fig. 2 indicates that priming shifted the psychometric
functions horizontally to the right, that is, towards
positive target SOAs. This shift indicates perceptual
latency priming. Compared with the functions in un-
primed trials, those of primed trials were displaced il-
lustrating that simultaneity was perceived when the
unprimed stimulus led the primed one by a considerable
interval. Distractor condition had no inﬂuence on the
shift. A diﬀerential eﬀect of congruent and incongruent
primes was also absent. Individual PSS were subjected
to a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA. It revealed
a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of priming (F ð2; 20Þ ¼ 21:82,
P < 0:0001). Bonferroni comparisons at the 0.05 level
indicated a diﬀerence between the unprimed and both
primed conditions. Neither a main eﬀect of distractor
condition nor an interaction of priming and distractor
condition was found (both F < 1). In unprimed trials,
the PSS amounted to )5 ms. In the primed trials, PSS
was on average 44 ms. Perceptual latency priming thus
was 49 ms.
A two-way ANOVA of DL revealed a signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of distractor condition (F ð2; 20Þ ¼ 15:43,
P < 0:001). There were no signiﬁcant Bonferroni com-
parisons (all P > 0:05). Neither a main eﬀect of priming
4 We did not monitor eye movements since, in a yet unpublished
experiment, perceptual latency priming was found independent of eye
movements. Targets were presented on the vertical midline of the
display. Eye movements were assessed via the vEOG electrode. Trials
with an vEOG amplitude of more than 40 lV were removed from
further analysis. In the reduced set of data, perceptual latency priming
amounted to 46 ms while it was 45 ms in the full data set. Further, the
onset interval between prime and target was 96 ms in the present study
which does not suﬃce for executing a saccade.
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nor an interaction of priming and distractor condition
was found (both F < 1). DL was largest (that is, per-
formance lowest) when the distractor preceded the
prime (54 ms), intermediate with an intermediate dis-
tractor (46 ms), and smallest with a trailing distractor
(40 ms).
3.2.2. Signal discrimination task
From the judgments, d 0 was calculated as an index of
discrimination performance (Green & Swets, 1966).
Mean d 0 was )0.12 which is very close to zero (a d 0 value
of zero indicates chance performance).
3.3. Discussion
Experiment 1 revealed a priming eﬀect of 49 ms.
Further, varying the timing of the distractor relative to
the prime and the primed target had no inﬂuence on
perceived order (PSS). It appears that irrelevant di-
stractors do not compromise perceptual latency prim-
ing. Similar results have been reported in the visual
search literature. For example, Theeuwes and Burger
(1998) deﬁned relevance by color. Distractors of a
known color that appeared simultaneously with the
targets did not capture attention. As in previous TOJ
studies (Scharlau & Neumann, in press), no diﬀerential
eﬀect of congruent and incongruent primes was found.
Thus, similarity between the primes and the set of
searched-for features rather than similarity between
the primes and the trailing targets at the very same
positions was responsible for perceptual latency prim-
ing.
The distractor condition inﬂuenced discrimination
performance (DL). The distractor impaired perception
of the target pair, and the earlier in the sequence the
distractor was presented, the larger was the inﬂuence.
Thus, the distractors were processed, but evidently they
did not capture attention, as indicated by the unchanged
perceptual latency eﬀects of the primes in the diﬀerent
distractor conditions. Likely, non-spatial ﬁltering costs
accounted for the DL eﬀect of the distractors. For ex-
ample, the latency of reading a single word is increased
if a pattern of dots is presented simultaneously with the
word (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1983). Filtering might
delay the deployment of attention to the appropriate
location, that is, distractors might have been ﬁltered out
preattentively.
However, diﬀerent inﬂuences of distractors and
primes could be due to confounding factors. For in-
stance, distractor-target and distractor-prime SOAs
were larger or smaller than prime-target SOAs in Ex-
periment 1. Therefore, capture by the distractors can-
not be directly compared to capture by the primes. To
rule out that a confounding factor was responsible for
the diﬀerential eﬀects of distractors and primes, we
compared perceptual latency priming of both masked
target-like and masked distractor-like primes presented
prior to one of the targets with identical SOAs in Ex-
periment 2.
An additional signal discrimination task revealed a
d 0 value that was very close to zero indicating no
perception of the prime. This is in accordance with
earlier studies that have demonstrated that the stimuli
used in the present experiments are typically totally
masked (Klotz & Neumann, 1999), and that percep-
tual latency priming is present if d 0 does not diﬀer
from zero (Experiment 2 in Scharlau & Neumann, in
press). We will return to the question of masking in
Experiment 3.
0.0
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-96 -32 32 96
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congruent
incongruent
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Fig. 2. Results of Experiment 1. Top: leading distractor; middle: in-
termediate distractor; bottom: trailing distractor. The horizontal dis-
placement is the same in the three distractor conditions.
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4. Experiment 2
Experiment 2 addressed the question whether per-
ceptual latency priming is found if the primes shape is
similar to that of the distractor. If a distractor-like prime
entailed perceptual latency priming, this would support
the bottom-up-capture hypothesis or a priority for
capture by abrupt onsets independently of a further
match to the searched-for features. The DPS account
predicts a strongly diminished, if not absent, priming
eﬀect of distractor-like primes. In Experiment 2a, the
primes shape resembles the distractor shape; in Exper-
iment 2b, it resembles the targets shapes.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Experiment 2a
Participants. Eleven voluntary participants took part
in the experiment (5 female; mean age 27.6 years). Par-
ticipants received € 4.50 or course credits. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
Two participants data had to be removed since they
were not able to discriminate temporal order.
General design, apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The
experiment consisted of one TOJ session which lasted
about 45 min. Apparatus did not diﬀer from Experiment
1. In each trial, 8 stimuli were presented, 6 distractors
and a target pair. In half of the trials, a smaller replica of
the distractor was shown as a prime. It preceded one of
the targets at its location with an onset interval of 96 ms.
Target and distractor shapes did not diﬀer from Ex-
periment 1. The stimuli appeared equidistantly on an
imaginary circle centered on ﬁxation with a radius of 9.
A ﬁxation spot consisting of a small black rectangle was
visible on the screen throughout the experiment.
Apart from the prime, a sequence of eight visual el-
ements at 48 ms intervals was presented in each trial (see
Fig. 3 for a sample trial). Six of the elements were di-
stractors, and two were targets. Target SOAs were )144,
)96, )48, +48, +96, and +144 ms. Distractors were
presented at an interval of 48 ms to each other and to
target stimuli. Any sequence began and ended with at
least one distractor. In half of the trials, a prime pre-
ceded one of the targets. Priming SOA was 96 ms. In the
other half, no prime was presented (unprimed condi-
tion). Targets and distractors were presented until the
judgment was made. Prime duration was 16 ms. Spatial
sequences of targets and distractors were created ran-
domly. There were 12 conditions (6 target SOAs 2
priming conditions). Each condition was repeated 64
times resulting in a total of 768 trials. Instruction did not
diﬀer from Experiment 1.
4.1.2. Experiment 2b
Participants. Twenty-two voluntary participants took
part in Experiment 2b (12 female; mean age 23.5 years).
Participants received € 4 or course credits. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
One participant was not able to discriminate temporal
order.
General design, apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The
experiment consisted of a TOJ session that lasted about
40 min. Apparatus did not diﬀer from Experiments 1
and 2a. In each trial, 8 stimuli were presented, 6 di-
stractors and a target pair. In two thirds of the trials, a
target-like prime preceded one of the targets. Target,
prime, and distractor shapes did not diﬀer from Exper-
iment 1. The sequence of events did not diﬀer from
Experiment 2a. Priming could either be congruent or
incongruent, or no prime was presented. Thus, there
were 18 experimental conditions (6 target SOAs 3
priming conditions). Each condition was repeated 32
times in each session in a random order resulting in a
total of 576 trials. Instruction did not diﬀer from Ex-
periments 1 and 2a.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Experiment 2a
Data were analysed as above. As can be seen from
Fig. 4 (upper part), a priming eﬀect was absent. A two-
way ANOVA of PSS did not reveal an eﬀect of priming
(F < 1). Mean PSS was )1 ms for unprimed, and 5 ms
for primed conditions. Mean DL was 94 ms. No inﬂu-
ence of priming on DL was found (F ð1; 8Þ ¼ 1:42,
P ¼ 0:27).
4.2.2. Experiment 2b
In Experiment 2b, 5 out of 22 participants produced
large negative priming eﬀects. Their data were omitted
and will be discussed separately below. Fig. 4 (middle
part) indicates a PSS shift which is independent of prime
congruency. There was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of prim-
ing (F ð2; 30Þ ¼ 10:2, P < 0:01). Bonferroni comparisons
correct judgment:
“square first”
primed
stimulus
unprimed
stimulusprime
time
Fig. 3. Succession of events in a sample trial of Experiment 2a. The
prime does not match the target shape. Again, target, prime, and
distractor shapes are not drawn to scale, and temporal order, but not
duration, is given accurately.
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at the .05 level indicated that the unprimed condition
diﬀered from both primed conditions. PSS were 1, 29,
and 28 ms in the unprimed, congruent, and incongruent
conditions resulting in an average priming eﬀect of 28
ms. DL was not aﬀected by priming (F < 1). Mean DL
was 109 ms.
4.3. Discussion
In Experiment 2a, the primes shape resembled the
distractor elements. Although it onsetted abruptly, no
perceptual latency priming was found. Thus, a distrac-
tor-like, not intentionally searched-for prime did not
capture attention. In Experiment 2b, the primes shape
resembled a target shape, and perceptual latency prim-
ing was evident. Also, it was found to be about the same,
irrespective of whether prime and masking target were
of similar shapes (congruent condition) or not (incon-
gruent condition). Thus, Experiment 2 replicated the
results of Experiment 1. The observations support the
DPS account of an attention shift to the masked primes:
A necessary precondition for perceptual latency priming
was that masked primes matched the intentionally
searched-for target feature of shape which had to be
processed in order to solve the task (see Ansorge et al.,
2002; Ansorge & Neumann, 2001, for related results
with speeded responses). Providing the prime with an
abrupt onset was not suﬃcient to produce capture, al-
though targets onsetted abruptly, too.
The ﬁnding that non-matching primes did not cap-
ture attention may seem to be at odds with earlier results
from our laboratory: Scharlau and Neumann (in press)
reported that masked primes similar and dissimilar in
shape and color to the targets led to perceptual latency
priming eﬀects of the same size. However, in that study,
no distractors were presented. Thus, all abrupt onsets in
this earlier experiment indicated the location of one of
the targets. (In the present experiments, most of the
abrupt onsets were invalid and had to be disregarded.)
Thus, an alternative precondition for another mode of
intention-mediated capture by the masked stimuli (i.e.,
their predictability) was met in the study of Scharlau
and Neumann (see Yantis, 1993).
5. Experiment 3
Experiment 3a aimed at further support for the DPS
hypothesis. Inﬂuences of distractor-like and target-like
primes were investigated as a within-participants factor
rather than with diﬀerent samples. Also, the generality
of the DPS account was tested by using color instead of
shape as the feature discriminating between targets and
distractors. Again, according to the bottom-up-capture
account, all abrupt-onset primes will entail perceptual
latency priming since targets have abrupt onsets, too.
According to the DPS account, only the target-like
primes will entail perceptual latency priming since their
color, but not that of the distractor-like primes, matches
the target-directed control settings.
In Experiment 3b, we tested whether the color primes
were masked. Masking was assessed by discrimination
(i.e., the degree to which participants were aware of the
primes relevant feature) and detection (i.e., the amount
to which they were aware of the presence of the prime).
Discrimination performance is the critical test for the
DPS model. Finding that the prime color is well masked
would support the DPS hypothesis that control of at-
0.0
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unprimed
distractor
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0.8
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-144 -96 -48 48 96 144
congruent
incongruent
unprimed
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
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unprimed
congruent
distractor
Fig. 4. Results of Experiments 2 and 3a. Top: Experiment 2a; middle:
Experiment 2b; bottom: Experiment 3a.
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tention shifts is possible without conscious discrimina-
tion of the prime. Finding that the primes presence is
well masked would further support this notion.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Experiment 3a
Participants.Twenty-three voluntary participants
took part in the experiment (12 female; mean age 26.9
years). Participants received € 10 or course credits. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity.
General Design, Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure.
The experiment consisted of two TOJ sessions each of
which lasted about 50 min. The sessions diﬀered in the
distractor color used and in the mappings of target
colors to responses (see below).
Color stimuli of matched subjective brightness were
presented in red, yellow, or blue on a dark grey back-
ground. Apart from that, apparatus did not diﬀer from
Experiments 1 and 2. One of the colors was chosen as
the distractor color and had to be ignored. Distractor
and target colors were balanced across participants and
sessions. Targets were rings of 2.5. Primes were smaller
rings which ﬁtted into the inner contours of the targets.
The sequence of events was the same as in Experi-
ment 2b. Number and spatial arrangement of distractors
also were the same as before. In two thirds of the trials, a
prime preceded one of the targets. Prime color was ei-
ther congruent (the color of the masking target) or dis-
tractor-like. There were 18 experimental conditions (6
target SOAs 3 priming conditions). Each condition
was presented 42 times in each session in a random
order resulting in a total of 756 trials per session. Par-
ticipants judged the temporal order of the targets by
reporting the color of the ﬁrst target. In the second
session, the distractor color was exchanged with one of
the target colors. Each session lasted approximately
45 min.
5.1.2. Experiment 3b
Participants. Twenty-four voluntary participants
took part in the experiment (14 female; mean age 26.4
years). Participants received € 3 or course credits. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The experiment
consisted of one session which lasted about 30 min.
Stimuli and apparatus did not diﬀer from Experiment
3a. Participants were randomly assigned to either the
discrimination or the detection group. Both groups re-
ceived a total of 504 trials (6 SOAs 2 priming condi-
tions 42 replications). In the discrimination group, a
prime was present in each trial. In one half, it was
congruent (had a targets color), in the other half, it had
the same color as the distractor. The participants in this
group judged if the primes color was target-like or
distractor-like. One half of them indicated ‘‘target
color’’ with the left, and ‘‘distractor color’’ with the right
mouse button; for the other half, this assignment was
reversed. For the detection group, no prime was pre-
sented in half of the trials. In the other half, either a
congruent or a distractor prime was presented. After
each trial, the participants indicated whether they had
seen a prime or not. One half of participants indicated
presence of a prime with the left mouse button and
absence with the right mouse button; for the other half,
this assignment was reversed. The sequence of events in
each trial was the same as in Experiment 3a.
5.2. Results
5.2.1. Experiment 3a
Data were analysed as before. Three participants had
to be excluded from further analysis due to large nega-
tive priming eﬀects; their data will be discussed sepa-
rately below. Psychometric functions can be seen in Fig.
4 (lower part). The primes inﬂuence on psychometric
functions varied due to its features. A one-way ANOVA
of PSS revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of priming (F ð2; 38Þ ¼
14:42, P < 0:01). Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons (P <
0:05) conﬁrmed that the target-like condition diﬀered
from both the unprimed and the distractor-like condi-
tion which did not diﬀer among themselves. PSS was
3 ms in unprimed trials, 31 ms in congruent trials, and
13 ms in distractor trials. Perceptual latency priming
thus was 28 ms with a congruent prime, and no per-
ceptual latency priming was found with a distractor-like
prime that was not intentionally searched for. DL did
not vary with priming condition (F < 1). Mean DL was
108 ms.
5.2.2. Experiment 3b
One set of data was lost due to computer malfunc-
tion. The d 0 for discrimination did not diﬀer from zero
which indicates chance performance (mean d 0 ¼ 0:14;
tð11Þ ¼ 1:74, P ¼ 0:11). The d 0 for detection was high
and diﬀered signiﬁcantly from zero (mean d 0 ¼ 3:45;
tð10Þ ¼ 23:85, P < 0:0001).
5.3. Discussion
Experiment 3a conﬁrmed that perceptual latency
priming depended on a match between the primes color
and the intentionally searched-for color of the target.
Perceptual latency priming was much smaller with dis-
tractor-like than with target-like primes. Thus, Experi-
ment 3a conﬁrmed the DPS hypothesis of attentional
control. Not abrupt onsets per se, but onsets of stimuli
which share static searched-for features that are part of
the observers set reliably elicit an attention shift. The
inﬂuence of distractor primes did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
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from zero. However, there was a residual distractor ef-
fect. A distractor-like prime presented intermixedly with
target-like primes thus probably can also elicit an at-
tention shift, but either more rarely or less eﬃciently
than a prime that contains the intentionally searched-for
features.
The results of Experiment 3b indicated that partici-
pants were very good in detecting the presence of the
prime, but only marginally better than chance in dis-
criminating its color. The task-relevant or intentionally
searched-for feature thus was well masked. This ﬁnding
supports the DPS account which predicts that masked
visual information may be used to specify response pa-
rameters. In contrast to discrimination, detection of the
prime was very eﬃcient. Certainly, higher detection than
discrimination performance does not account for dif-
ferential eﬀects of distractor-like and target-like primes.
Further, earlier studies have shown that both presence
and magnitude of perceptual latency priming are inde-
pendent of the amount to which participants are able to
detect the prime (Scharlau & Neumann, in press). Also,
the good detection performance should have fostered
attentional or contingent capture. This is in marked
contrast with the intention-dependent eﬀect of the
masked primes in Experiment 3a.
6. Analysis of discarded data
In Experiments 2b and 3a, 8 out of 45 participants
revealed a reversed pattern of eﬀects and were discarded
from analysis. From the DPS concept, no hypotheses
concerning these reversed eﬀects can be derived. Fig. 5
depicts the averaged psychometric functions of the
participants with reversed eﬀects. Several features
characterised the discarded data in contrast to those
analysed above. (1) The psychometric functions did not
seem to be of sigmoid shape but rather linear (unpri-
med) or non-symmetrical (primed) with respect to the
range of target SOAs. (2) The primed and unprimed
functions did not converge at the extreme target SOAs.
The intervals used, however, covered those intervals in
which psychometric functions typically converge (see,
for example, Fig. 4, and Scharlau & Neumann, in press).
The direction of a displacement cannot be inferred from
a linear function. The functions thus may be vertically
or horizontally shifted. (3) Priming eﬀects on PSS were
not only reversed but also numerically larger than the
priming SOA which was 96 ms: )169/)131 ms in Ex-
periment 2b, and )107/)97 ms in Experiment 3a. (4)
Performance was lower.
The observations (2) and (3) hint at an explanation of
the reversed priming eﬀect. Participants with reversed
performance possibly showed a massive inhibition of the
primed location. A primed stimulus had to be presented
much earlier than an unprimed target to be perceived as
simultaneous. This inhibition seemed to be independent
of the temporal interval between the targets. It even
arose if the target SOA was as large as 144 ms, an in-
terval in which temporal order is easy to discriminate.
The reverse eﬀect might thus be due to strategic deci-
sions, for example favouring the unprimed location
whenever a prime was detected. Such a strategy would
also explain the size of the PSS shifts. For purely logical
reasons, the attentional eﬀect cannot be larger than the
priming SOA. The reversed eﬀects, however, clearly
exceeded the priming SOA. Possibly related interference
by valid cues has been reported in several studies in
which cues and targets were almost identical (e.g., Ber-
lucchi, Chelazzi, & Tassinari, 2000; Tassinari & Ber-
lucchi, 1993). By contrast, other researchers reported
facilitation by peripheral cues that were similar to the
targets in location and color (e.g., Jonides, 1981; Rem-
ington et al., 1992). The diﬀerences between these studies
may be explained by diﬀerent strategies in dealing with
processing of similar cues and targets. It is commonly
assumed that the strategies participants use in experi-
ments are homogeneous. Nevertheless, strategies are
often heterogeneous if, as in the present study, inten-
tions or control settings rather than mere procedural
features are responsible for the eﬀects (see, e.g., Hom-
mel, 1993). Further research is needed to settle the
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Fig. 5. Data of discarded participants. Top: Experiment 2b; bottom:
Experiment 3a.
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question which strategies were favoured by participants
that showed inhibition by valid primes or cues and those
that showed facilitation.
7. General discussion
The experiments reported above used temporal order
judgments to assess the inﬂuences of masked primes on
perceived latency of the masking targets. Distractors
and distractor-like primes deﬁned by task-irrelevant
features had no or small eﬀects (Experiments 1, 2a, and
3a). By contrast, primes deﬁned by the searched-for
features of the task-relevant target facilitated perceived
latency (Experiments 2b and 3a). Thus, orienting of
attention which mediates perceptual latency priming
was conditional upon a match of the primes to the in-
tentionally searched-for features of the target, that is, its
shape (Experiments 1 and 2) or its color (Experiment
3a). Also, similarity between the primes and the set
rather than similarity between the primes and the targets
at the same positions was responsible for perceptual
latency priming: Congruent and incongruent primes had
the same attentional eﬀects (Experiments 1 and 2b; see
also Scharlau & Neumann, in press). The diﬀerential
eﬀect of searched-for and task-irrelevant information on
attention was present although this information was
well masked (Experiments 3b and 1).
These ﬁndings invalidate a bottom-up capture account
of perceptual latency priming since both abrupt-onset
distractors and distractor-like primes did not entail at-
tentional capture. An abrupt onset is not a suﬃcient
means of capturing attention. The contingent-capture
account could be easily modiﬁed to accommodate the
ﬁndings of the present study. For instance, control set-
tings for static features can be apparently narrowly de-
ﬁned in some conditions. If participants search for a
speciﬁc color, irrelevant color singletons can be eﬀec-
tively ignored (e.g., Folk & Remington, 1998). Modiﬁ-
cations of abrupt-onset perceptual latency priming
eﬀects by matches between static features of the prime
and the corresponding control settings are possibly not
at odds with the contingent-capture account.
In any case, DPS can explain the main ﬁndings of the
present study. According to the DPS account, atten-
tional capture depends strongly on the prior set-up of a
corresponding top-down control setting (e.g., the com-
pletion of an action plan) directed to the features of the
targets. For instance, Neumann and Klotz (1994) ob-
served DPS-induced response priming only if partici-
pants had suﬃcient time to prepare shape-to-response
mappings prior to the onsets of the invisible shape
primes. The current study extends the previous ﬁndings
to show that attention shifts induced by masked primes
may be due to DPS. Attention was captured by the
masked abrupt-onset stimuli which resembled the tar-
gets and thus matched top-down action plans for fea-
tures such as shape or color (target-like primes).
Correspondingly, abrupt-onset stimuli which were dis-
similar in their features to the action plans (i.e., di-
stractors and masked distractor-like primes) captured
attention only weakly (Experiment 3a) or not at all
(Experiments 1 and 2a). In sum, it seems that if the
action plan is to shift attention in response to a deﬁned
target, irrelevant, to-be-ignored information may cap-
ture attention, though only if it matches the intention-
ally searched-for features.
One feature of the DPS model is that it treats the
control of attention and sensorimotor control as closely
related phenomena. This feature corresponds to recent
views on attentional guidance. According to, for exam-
ple, the premotor theory of attention, covert shifts of
attention are coupled to motor commands for overt eye
movements (Rizzolatti et al., 1987). In order to covertly
shift attention, a motor program for a saccade has to be
established although the eye movement does not need to
be carried out. Deubel and Schneider (1996) demon-
strated that, while preparing a saccade, attention and
saccades are necessarily directed towards the same tar-
get. They instructed their participants with an exoge-
nous cue to prepare a saccade. After preparation, a
discrimination target appeared at or near the target lo-
cation of the saccade. Discrimination of this target was
improved exclusively if it was at the location to which
the planned saccade was directed whereas non-saccade
item discrimination was very diﬃcult, even if the item
was located more foveally than the saccade location,
and even if the actual saccade (that was carried out later)
by mistake terminated on the discrimination target
rather than on the saccade target. The coupling between
attention and sensorimotor saccade programming thus
seems to be obligatory supporting the DPS concept of
attention as a part of visually guided action control.
Following a related line of argumentation, Bekkering
and Neggers (2002) demonstrated that visuospatial at-
tention can be improved by actions at an early stage.
Their participants searched for a target of a speciﬁc
color or orientation and either grasped the target or
pointed at it. In contrast to pointing, grasping includes
processing of orientation. Saccadic accuracy was better
if participants grasped those objects than if they pointed
at them. This was only found for search by orientation
and not for search by color. Bekkering and Neggers
explain their ﬁndings as indicating that the intention of
an action ameliorates attentional orienting, supporting
the notion of top-down modulation of attentional pro-
cesses in close relationship to action control.
Note also that according to the DPS account, atten-
tional capture is not contingent on a prior conscious
perception of the capturing stimuli. Therefore, the DPS
account dovetails neatly with another aspect of the
present investigation. Visibility of the primes was
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compromised by backward masking in all of the ex-
periments of the present study. Yet, perceptual latency
priming was possible under these conditions (for related
results see also Jaskowski et al., 2002; Lambert et al.,
1999; Mattler, in press; McCormick, 1997; Scharlau,
2002; Scharlau & Neumann, in press; Steglich & Neu-
mann, 2000).
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